我们下一步的任务是研究未来，不是这和逝世后。我们区分的原因，以及国家的定义，普遍认为，在这些过程中，作为统一的变化可预见的所有的东西，到会并通过外卖的性质。此外，我们要研究的增长和'改变'。我们必须询问事情的每一个，以及是否'改变'，是与即将确定的到会，或是否有这些不同的名称对应两个不同性质的独立的进程。在这个问题上，确实，早期的哲学家划分。他们有的说，所谓的资格来对是'是'改变'，而另一些认为，'改变'和未来，不是这是不同的。对于那些谁说，宇宙是什么（即那些谁创造出一件事，就是所有的东西），必将断言，未来的，不是这是'改变'，而不管'来对以适当的'一词的意义是'被改变'：但那些谁使事情不止一个问题必须分清来对从'改变'。为此后一类属于恩培多克勒，阿那克萨哥拉，和流西普斯。然而，阿那克萨哥拉他不明白自己的话语。他说，在所有的事件，即未来的，不是这和逝世后，是为'一样被改变'：'但是，同其他思想家，他申明，内容是多方面的。因此，恩培多克勒认为，有形的因素有四个，而所有元素，包括那些发起运动在第六;而阿那克萨哥拉与流西普斯和克利特同意的元素是无限的。 （阿那克萨哥拉假定作为元素
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    OUR next task is to study coming-to-be and passing-away. We are to distinguish the causes, and to state the definitions, of these processes considered in general-as changes predicable uniformly of all the things that come-to-be and pass-away by nature. Further, we are to study growth and 'alteration'. We must inquire what each of them is; and whether 'alteration' is to be identified with coming-to-be, or whether to these different names there correspond two separate processes with distinct natures. On this question, indeed, the early philosophers are divided. Some of them assert that the so-called 'unqualified coming-to-be' is 'alteration', while others maintain that 'alteration' and coming-to-be are distinct. For those who say that the universe is one something (i.e. those who generate all things out of one thing) are bound to assert that coming-to-be is 'alteration', and that whatever 'comes-to-be' in the proper sense of the term is 'being altered': but those who make the matter of things more than one must distinguish coming-to-be from 'alteration'. To this latter class belong Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Leucippus. And yet Anaxagoras himself failed to understand his own utterance. He says, at all events, that coming-to-be and passing-away are the same as 'being altered':' yet, in common with other thinkers, he affirms that the elements are many. Thus Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, while all the elements-including those which initiate movement-are six in number; whereas Anaxagoras agrees with Leucippus and Democritus that the elements are infinite. (Anaxagoras posits as elements the 'homoeomeries', viz. bone, flesh, marrow, and everything else which is such that part and whole are the same in name and nature; while Democritus and Leucippus say that there are indivisible bodies, infinite both in number and in the varieties of their shapes, of which everything else is composed-the compounds differing one from another according to the shapes, 'positions', and 'groupings' of their constituents.) For the views of the school of Anaxagoras seem diametrically opposed to those of the followers of Empedocles. Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air, and Earth are four elements, and are thus 'simple' rather than flesh, bone, and bodies which, like these, are 'homoeomeries'. But the followers of Anaxagoras regard the 'homoeomeries' as 'simple' and elements, whilst they affirm that Earth, Fire, Water, and Air are composite; for each of these is (according to them) a 'common seminary' of all the 'homoeomeries'. Those, then, who construct all things out of a single element, must maintain that coming-tobe and passing-away are 'alteration'. For they must affirm that the underlying something always remains identical and one; and change of such a substratum is what we call 'altering' Those, on the other hand, who make the ultimate kinds of things more than one, must maintain that 'alteration' is distinct from coming-to-be: for coming-to-be and passingaway result from the consilience and the dissolution of the many kinds. That is why Empedocles too uses language to this effect, when he says 'There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled'. Thus it is clear (i) that to describe coming-to-be and passing-away in these terms is in accordance with their fundamental assumption, and (ii) that they do in fact so describe them: nevertheless, they too must recognize 'alteration' as a fact distinct from coming to-be, though it is impossible for them to do so consistently with what they say. That we are right in this criticism is easy to perceive. For 'alteration' is a fact of observation. While the substance of the thing remains unchanged, we see it 'altering' just as we see in it the changes of magnitude called 'growth' and 'diminution'. Nevertheless, the statements of those who posit more 'original reals' than one make 'alteration' impossible. For 'alteration, as we assert, takes place in respect to certain qualities: and these qualities (I mean, e.g. hot-cold, white-black, dry-moist, soft-hard, and so forth) are, all of them, differences characterizing the 'elements'. The actual words of Empedocles may be "ed in illustration-