我们必须在今后的地方，调查的梦想的主题，首先询问了哪些它提出了自己的灵魂，即是否感情有一项涉及情报的教师或感觉，知觉的学院，因为这些都是在我们的唯一学部其中我们获取知识。如果以后，教师的视线行使实际看，教师的听觉，听力，这和一般认为教师的意识知觉，感知，以及是否有一些共同的看法感觉，这种如图，规模，运动，与角，但也有其他的颜色，声音，味道独特，[每一自己的感觉]，进一步，如果所有的生物，当眼睛在睡眠封闭的情况，看不到，而类似的说法是正确的其他感官，使我们明显感觉到没有睡着的时候，我们可以得出结论，这是不知觉，我们感觉到一个梦想。但是，无论是认为，我们这样做了。对于梦[]我们不仅断言，例如有些物体接近是一个人或一马[这将是一项意见的过程中]，但该对象为白色或美丽，点上没有意义的意见，看法也没有真正的断言或者冒用。然而，这一事实令的灵魂在睡眠这种说法。我们似乎看到同样清楚，接近的数字是一个男人，而且是白色的。 [在梦想]，我们也想别的东西，对以上介绍的梦想，正如我们在不清醒的时刻，当我们感觉到的东西，因为我们经常说的也对我们所感知的原因。同样，在睡眠中，我们有时我们的思想之前的想法不是仅仅幻觉等。这将是明显的任何一个谁应该参加并尝试，立即从睡眠中产生的，要记住[他做梦经验]。还有是谁看到这样的梦想，这些，例如，谁相信自己的人的案件是精神上的科目安排给名单根据记忆规则。他们经常发现自己的东西，除了在梦中，即其他从事。在设置一个幻象，他们到其记忆的立场设想。因此，很明显，不是每个'幻象睡眠'只是一个梦想的形象，而且进一步的思考，然后我们执行的原因是对教师工作的意见。这么多至少是平原在所有这些问题，即。认为其中，教师在醒着的时候，我们受到疾病的影响时的幻想，是与那种虚幻的睡眠产生的影响相同。因此，即使在一个人的身体非常健康，并了解案件的事实非常清楚，太阳，然而，他们似乎只有一英尺宽。现在，无论是灵魂的表象与教师相同或不同，教师的意识，在两种情况下之嫌，但不会出现幻觉没有我们真正看到或[其他]感知的东西。即使看到或听到的错误可能发生错误只有一个谁看到或听到一些真实的，虽然不完全是他假定。但是，我们的假设，在没有看到一个睡眠，也听到，也没有任何意义任何演习。也许我们可以把它作为真实的梦什么也看不见，但由于假，他的学院知觉的影响，事实上，因应看到与其他感官感觉可能是某种方式的影响，然后，而每这些情感，并作出适当的时候，他醒了，给它的冲动以某种方式对他[小学]教师的感觉恰好相同的方式，但前提是他不会醒来。有时候，舆论说，[对梦想家]就像那些谁清醒的时候，该对象看到的是一种幻想，是抑制在其它时间，变成了纯粹的幻觉追随者。很明显，因此，这个感情，我们的名字'梦'，没有单纯的意见或情报工作，但尚未不是一种知觉的教师在简单意义上的感情。如果是后者，有可能[时睡着]听到和看到的简单意义。又如何，以及以何种方式，它需要的地方，就是我们去研究。让我们假设，什么是确实很清楚，但[做梦]涉及意识的认识，一定是睡眠本身的感情。睡眠并不属于一个动物器官和梦想到另一个都涉及到相同的器官。但是，由于我们在，我们在灵魂的工作，处理的介绍，并介绍了学院是一致的感觉与知觉，虽然教师的介绍基本的概念是从教师的感觉不同，知觉而由于演讲是一家由多个感觉在实际履行其职责教师，而梦想似乎是一个简报（用于演示文稿是在睡眠时，无论简单或在某些特定的方式，就是我们所说的一个梦想了运动）：有以下明显的梦想是对教师活动的感觉知觉，但属于这个教师条件表象的。
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    WE must, in the next place, investigate the subject of the dream, and first inquire to which of the faculties of the soul it presents itself, i.e. whether the affection is one which pertains to the faculty of intelligence or to that of sense-perception; for these are the only faculties within us by which we acquire knowledge. If, then, the exercise of the faculty of sight is actual seeing, that of the auditory faculty, hearing, and, in general that of the faculty of sense-perception, perceiving; and if there are some perceptions common to the senses, such as figure, magnitude, motion, &c., while there are others, as colour, sound, taste, peculiar [each to its own sense]; and further, if all creatures, when the eyes are closed in sleep, are unable to see, and the analogous statement is true of the other senses, so that manifestly we perceive nothing when asleep; we may conclude that it is not by sense-perception we perceive a dream. But neither is it by opinion that we do so. For [in dreams] we not only assert, e.g. that some object approaching is a man or a horse [which would be an exercise of opinion], but that the object is white or beautiful, points on which opinion without sense-perception asserts nothing either truly or falsely. It is, however, a fact that the soul makes such assertions in sleep. We seem to see equally well that the approaching figure is a man, and that it is white. [In dreams], too, we think something else, over and above the dream presentation, just as we do in waking moments when we perceive something; for we often also reason about that which we perceive. So, too, in sleep we sometimes have thoughts other than the mere phantasms immediately before our minds. This would be manifest to any one who should attend and try, immediately on arising from sleep, to remember [his dreaming experience]. There are cases of persons who have seen such dreams, those, for example, who believe themselves to be mentally arranging a given list of subjects according to the mnemonic rule. They frequently find themselves engaged in something else besides the dream, viz. in setting a phantasm which they envisage into its mnemonic position. Hence it is plain that not every 'phantasm' in sleep is a mere dream-image, and that the further thinking which we perform then is due to an exercise of the faculty of opinion. So much at least is plain on all these points, viz. that the faculty by which, in waking hours, we are subject to illusion when affected by disease, is identical with that which produces illusory effects in sleep. So, even when persons are in excellent health, and know the facts of the case perfectly well, the sun, nevertheless, appears to them to be only a foot wide. Now, whether the presentative faculty of the soul be identical with, or different from, the faculty of sense-perception, in either case the illusion does not occur without our actually seeing or [otherwise] perceiving something. Even to see wrongly or to hear wrongly can happen only to one who sees or hears something real, though not exactly what he supposes. But we have assumed that in sleep one neither sees, nor hears, nor exercises any sense whatever. Perhaps we may regard it as true that the dreamer sees nothing, yet as false that his faculty of sense-perception is unaffected, the fact being that the sense of seeing and the other senses may possibly be then in a certain way affected, while each of these affections, as duly as when he is awake, gives its impulse in a certain manner to his [primary] faculty of sense, though not in precisely the same manner as when he is awake. Sometimes, too, opinion says [to dreamers] just as to those who are awake, that the object seen is an illusion; at other times it is inhibited, and becomes a mere follower of the phantasm. It is plain therefore that this affection, which we name 'dreaming', is no mere exercise of opinion or intelligence, but yet is not an affection of the faculty of perception in the simple sense. If it were the latter it would be possible [when asleep] to hear and see in the simple sense. How then, and in what manner, it takes place, is what we have to examine. Let us assume, what is indeed clear enough, that the affection [of dreaming] pertains to sense-perception as surely as sleep itself does. For sleep does not pertain to one organ in animals and dreaming to another; both pertain to the same organ. But since we have, in our work On the Soul, treated of presentation, and the faculty of presentation is identical with that of sense-perception, though the essential notion of a faculty of presentation is different from that of a faculty of sense-perception; and since presentation is the movement set up by a sensory faculty when actually discharging its function, while a dream appears to be a presentation (for a presentation which occurs in sleep-whether simply or in some particular way-is what we call a dream): it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the faculty of sense-perception, but belongs to this faculty qua presentative.